This paper studies endogenous information manipulation in games where a population can overthrow a regime if individuals coordinate. The benchmark game has a unique equilibrium and in this equilibrium propaganda is effective if signals are sufficiently precise. Despite playing against perfectly rational individuals, a regime is able to manipulate information in a way that exploits heterogeneity in individual beliefs so that at equilibrium its chances of surviving are higher than they otherwise would be. This result is robust to alternative payoffs where the regime cares only for survival and to a number of alternative information structures, including situations where individuals have access to high-quality private information that is entirely uncontaminated by the regime.
This paper studies the use of biased information to manipulate outcomes in coordination games of regime change.
2 In these games, there are two outcomes of interest -either the preservation of a status quo or its overthrow. 3 I show that a regime with an interest in ensuring society coordinates on the status quo may be able to manipulate information to achieve that outcome in equilibrium.
Section 1 outlines the model. Individuals with an interest in preserving the status quo are treated as a single agent playing against a heterogeneous population of small agents. Each small player can take either an action that adversely affects the regime or an action that supports it.
The actions of the small players are strategic complements. If enough people take the action that undermines the regime, then it is overturned. As in Morris and Shin (1998) and similar models, the ability of the regime to prevail is determined by a single parameter. Individuals are imperfectly informed about this parameter and in principle may coordinate either on overturning the regime or on living with the status quo. In this paper, however, the regime is endowed with the ability to take a costly hidden action that influences the distribution of information. In the benchmark model, this signal-jamming technology allows the regime to shift the mean of the distribution from which individuals sample so that individuals receive information that at face-value suggests the regime is difficult to overthrow. Rational individuals understand that their information is contaminated by the regime's propaganda and evaluate their signals accordingly.
This paper makes two contributions. I first show that this coordination game with endogenous information manipulation has a unique equilibrium. I then show that signal-jamming is effective in equilibrium when the intrinsic precision of the signal distribution is high. As signal precision becomes increasingly high, so does the ex ante probability of the regime surviving. This suggests that a regime's propaganda apparatus will be more useful to it when individuals are receiving, from a technological standpoint, intrinsically high quality signals. Perhaps the information technology revolution may not be as threatening to autocratic regimes as is sometimes supposed.
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Equilibrium uniqueness is proved in Section 2. A key intermediate result is that, despite the regime's manipulation, in any candidate equilibrium individuals' assessments of the probability of the regime being overthrown are monotonic in their signals. This makes it possible to use 'global games' arguments along the lines of Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (1998) .
In particular, it is possible to first show that there exists a unique equilibrium when strategies are monotone and then to show that this is the only equilibrium which survives the iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
The effectiveness of signal-jamming when signals are precise is proved in Section 3. In equilib- 2 Cheli and Della-Posta (2002) study a coordination game where individuals' signals are exogenously biased. By contrast, this paper studies an equilibrium problem where the amount of bias introduced by the regime has to be compatible with rational beliefs on the part of information receivers.
3 The underlying coordination game employed in this paper has been used for many applications, including currency and debt crises, bank runs, and political unrest. See, for example, Obstfeld (1986 Obstfeld ( , 1996 , Morris and Shin (1998 , 2004 , Chamley (1999) and Atkeson (2000) . See also Cooper (1999) and Chamley (2004, 237-267) for textbook overviews with many additional applications.
4 See Kalathil and Boas (2003) for a discussion of the conventional wisdom on the role of information in undermining authoritarian regimes. They argue that the revolution in communication technologies like the internet is not likely to help in overthrowing such regimes.
rium, regimes are overthrown if their type is below an endogenous threshold. If a regime manipulates it generates a signal distribution with an artificially high mean that is strictly greater than the threshold. So if signals are precise, in this situation many individuals have signals suggesting the regime will survive. And consequently it is rational for any individual, when contemplating the beliefs of others, to assign relatively high probability to the event that they mostly have signals near this artificially high mean. At the margin this makes any individual less likely to attack and so the aggregate mass who do is relatively low. This in turn makes it more likely that the regime does in fact manipulate and create an artificially high signal mean thereby validating the original beliefs. Two things are critical to this argument. First, different types of regimes must take different actions so that there is uncertainty about the amount by which individuals should discount their signals: if all regimes took the same action, it would be easy to undo. Second, individuals must be imperfectly coordinated.
The equilibrium uniqueness result contrasts with Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2006) , who were the first to emphasize endogenous information in global games. Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2006) have in mind situations where a regime's policy choice (e.g., a central bank's interest rate in anticipation of a speculative attack) provides an additional signal about the regime's type.
Since individual strategies may or may not condition on the signal, this gives rise to both pooling and separating equilibria. In this paper, however, individuals' information is contaminated by a behind-the-scenes choice of the regime (e.g., pressure on a recalcitrant editor or general) that is commonly known to be possible but cannot be observed. Individuals have to disentangle the truth from the effects of the hidden action. In the benchmark model of Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2006) a pooling equilibrium occurs if all individuals believe that the regime will not intervene, for then the regime has no incentive to make a costly intervention. The regime is 'trapped' in an inactive policy equilibrium where the regime merely validates the belief that it will not intervene.
But in this paper if all individuals believe that the regime will not take any action, the regime has a powerful incentive to manipulate information so there can be no pooling equilibrium.
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Traditional theories of strategic information transmission, such as Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Matthews and Mirman (1983) , focus on a sole information receiver. In this paper there is instead a large cross-section of signal receivers. Since the incentives of the sender to manipulate depend on the aggregate behavior of the receivers and since individual actions are strategic complements, implicitly, each individual solves a filtering problem that depends simultaneously on the solutions to the filtering problems of all other receivers. Section 4 shows that results are robust to alternative payoffs for the regime that give it no direct incentive to manipulate. Section 5 extends the model to cover alternative information structures, including situations where some information is uncontaminated by the regime's manipulation and an alternate technology for the regime where its actions directly affect signal precision.
Model of information manipulation and regime change
There is a unit mass of citizens, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Citizens are ex ante identical. After drawing a signal (discussed below) each citizen decides whether to subvert the regime, s i = 1, or not, s i = 0. The population mass of subversives is S := 1 0 s i di. If a citizen subverts, she pays a fixed opportunity cost p > 0.
The citizens face a regime indexed by a hidden state variable, denoted θ, that is the regime's private information. The type θ is normalized such that the regime is overthrown if and only if θ < S. The payoff to a citizen is
where 1 denotes the indicator function. Individual actions s i and the population aggregate S are strategic complements: the more citizens subvert the regime, the more likely it is that the regime is overthrown and so the more likely it is that any individual citizen's best action is to also subvert.
After learning θ, a regime may take a hidden action a ≥ 0 that incurs a convex cost C(a)
where C(0) = 0, C (a) > 0 for a > 0 and C (a) ≥ 0 for all a. I begin by assuming that the regime obtains a benefit θ − S from remaining in power. The regime is not just concerned with remaining in power but also wants to keep S small when it does survive. If θ < S, the regime is overthrown and obtains an outside option with value normalized to zero. The payoff to a regime is therefore
where B(S, θ) := 1{θ ≥ S}(θ − S). Following a regime's hidden action a, each citizen simultaneously draws an idiosyncratic signal x i := θ+a+ε i where the noise ε i is independent of θ and is IID normally distributed with mean zero and precision α (that is, variance α −1 ). So the density of signals is f (x i |θ, a) :
where φ denotes the standard normal density. I begin by assuming that citizens have common priors for θ and that this prior is the (improper) uniform distribution over the whole real line. 6 The realization of the signal x i is informative for both the type of the regime θ and the hidden action a. This action is itself informative about the regime's type and rational citizens take this into account when forming their beliefs. In equilibrium, the action taken by a regime and the beliefs of citizens will need to be mutually consistent. The timing of the model is shown in Figure 1 .
6 I discuss informative priors and heterogeneous priors in Section 5 below.
Equilibrium
A symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium is an individual's posterior density π(θ|x i ), individual subversion decision s(x i ), mass of subversives S(θ, a) and hidden actions a(θ) such that
The first condition says that a citizen with information x i takes into account the regime's manipulation a(θ). The second says that given these beliefs, s(x i ) is chosen to maximize its expected payoff. The third condition aggregates individual decisions to give the mass of subversives.
The final condition says that the actions a(θ) maximize the regime's payoff. In equilibrium, the regime is overthrown if R(θ) := 1{θ < S(θ, a(θ))} = 1 while the regime survives if R(θ) = 0.
Discussion of model
Regime's payoffs. Conditional on surviving a regime obtains benefit θ − S and so has a direct aversion to S. Regimes prefer to avoid a Prague Spring or a Tiananmen Square. There are two distinct motivations for this. First, suppressing a riot is likely to be resource costly to the regime and it seems natural for this cost to be increasing in the mass of rioters. Second, loosely speaking, a benefit θ − S provides a simple way of modeling aversion to information generated by observations of large S. For example, in a dynamic version of this model citizens would observe (possibly with noise) the mass of people who have in the past attempted to overthrow the regime. The size of previous attacks contains information about θ -in particular, low S is associated with high θ -and so by keeping S low even when it will survive this period, the regime may have another tool for convincing individuals not to attack. 7 Section 4 shows that the main results of this paper go through when payoffs are instead determined by B(S, θ) = 1{θ ≥ S}v(θ) so that the regime cares only about survival and attaches (gross) value v(θ) to survival. Two specifications are considered:
In the former case the value of survival and the regime's strength, as measured by θ, are perfectly correlated. In the latter case, the value of survival and the regime's strength are independent.
Absence of free-rider problems. If a citizen is almost sure the regime will be overthrown she will subvert and will not free-ride on others. Although this seems unappealing, a bad free-rider problem is simply one of many factors that might lead to a high opportunity cost p. To see this formally, 7 More crudely, observations of large S might be able to convince foreign powers that it would be easy to assist the regime's opponents it in bringing the regime down. The θ − S specification also facilitates comparison with Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2006) , ensuring that the information structure is the only difference.
suppose citizens get a larger expected payoff if they were actively involved in the downfall of the regime.
8 Specifically, if the regime is overthrown a citizen gets random payoff w ∈ {w, w} with w < w and Pr(w = w) := ν(s i ) with 0 ≤ ν(1) < ν(0) ≤ 1. That is, a citizen may free-ride but if they do so they face a higher probability of being caught and penalized by getting only w. Then if the utility cost of subverting the regime is normalized to 1 and a citizen believes the regime will be overthrown with probability P (x i ), she will participate if and only if
equivalently, if and only if
If p ≥ 1 it can never be rational for a citizen to participate in subversion. To make the model interesting, then, we need:
Assumption 1. The opportunity cost of subversion is not too high: p < 1.
A citizen with P (x i ) < p chooses not to subvert, in part, because of the incentive to free-ride.
Intuitively, this incentive is weak if the probability of being caught out is sufficiently high or if the penalty from being caught is sufficiently severe.
Interpretation of hidden actions. The hidden action a ≥ 0 of the regime gives it the ability to choose the common component of individual beliefs and the potential to bias the information that citizens receive. If a > 0 citizens draw from a signal distribution that at face value suggests the regime will be more difficult to overthrow. This represents a situation where it is common knowledge that the regime is able to exert pressure on editors, force recalcitrant generals to stand on parade, etc -so as to depict itself as difficult to overthrow -but where it is not possible to observe that pressure or manipulation directly and it instead must be inferred. In Section 5 below I endow citizens with informative priors for θ, thereby giving individuals extra information that is independent of a.
Exogenous information benchmarks
Two important special cases of the model are when: (i) the regime's type is common knowledge, or
(ii) hidden actions are prohibitively expensive. In each case, citizens have exogenous information.
If θ is common knowledge, costly hidden actions are pointless and a(θ) = 0 all θ. The model reduces to the coordination game used by Obstfeld (1986 Obstfeld ( , 1996 to discuss self-fulfilling currency crises. If θ < 0, any crowd S ≥ 0 can overthrow the regime. It is optimal for any individual to subvert, all do so, and the regime is overthrown. If θ ≥ 1, no crowd can overthrow the regime. It 8 Perhaps it is more likely that a citizen will secure an influential position in the new regime if she participated in the overthrow of the old regime. Or perhaps retribution is exacted on those who are thought to have let others take the risks in overthrowing the regime. See, respectively, Jackson (2001) and Frommer (2005) for discussion of the retribution exacted on collaborators after the liberation of France and Czechoslovakia from Nazi rule.
is optimal for any individual to not riot, none do, and the regime survives. If θ ∈ [0, 1), the regime is 'fragile' and multiple self-fulfilling equilibria can be sustained. For example, if each individual believes that everyone else will riot, it will be optimal for each citizen to do so and S = 1 > θ leads to the regime's overthrow and the vindication of the initial expectations.
If hidden actions are prohibitively expensive, a(θ) = 0 all θ and each citizen has private signal
Because each citizen has a signal of the regime's type, expectations are no longer arbitrary. As discussed by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) , Morris and Shin (1998) 
where Φ denotes the standard normal CDF. In particular, θ *
The first condition says that if the regime's threshold is θ * MS , a citizen with signal x i = x * MS will be indifferent between subverting or not. The second condition says that if the signal threshold is x * MS , a regime with type θ = θ * MS will be indifferent. In the analysis below, I will say that a regime's hidden action technology is effective if in equilibrium θ * < θ * MS = 1 − p. To understand the consequences of information sets that are a function of the regime's manipulation, we need to study a more difficult equilibrium problem where the regime's manipulation is not trivial and citizens internalize a regime's incentives.
Unique equilibrium with hidden actions
The first main result of this paper is: Theorem 1. There is a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The equilibrium is monotone in the sense that there exist thresholds x * and θ * such that s(x i ) = 1 for x i < x * and zero otherwise while R(θ) = 1 for θ < θ * and zero otherwise.
Details of the proof are given in Appendix A. The proof shows that (i) there is a unique equilibrium in monotone strategies, and (ii) that the unique monotone equilibrium is the only equilibrium which survives the iterative elimination of interim strictly dominated strategies.
Unique equilibrium in monotone strategies
Letx ∈ R denote a candidate for the citizens' threshold in a monotone equilibrium and let θx and ax(θ) denote candidates for the regime's threshold and hidden actions givenx.
Regime's problem. Takingx as given the mass of citizens facing the regime is
Since the regime has access to an outside option normalized to zero, its problem can be written
where Wx(θ) is the best payoff regime θ can get if it is not overthrown
Lemma 1. For eachx ∈ R, the unique solution to the regime's decision problem is characterized by (i) a threshold θx ∈ [0, 1) such that the regime is overthrown if and only if θ < θx and (ii) a single-valued hidden action function ax : R → R + with ax(θ) = 0 for all θ < θx.
Using the envelope theorem and the definition of Sx(θ+a) in equation (10) shows that W x (θ) > 1 all θ. And since Wx(θ) < 0 for θ < 0 and Wx(1) > 0, by the intermediate value theorem there is a unique θx ∈ [0, 1) such that Wx(θx) = 0. Using (11), the regime is overthrown if and only if θ < θx. Since positive actions are costly, the regime takes no action for θ < θx. Otherwise, for θ ≥ θx, the actions of the regime solve
and the threshold θx is found from the indifference condition Wx(θx) = 0, or more explicitly
Takingx as given, (13)- (14) simultaneously determine the threshold θx and the hidden actions ax(θ) that characterize the solution to the regime's problem.
Because of the additive signal structure a unit increase in θ and a unit increase inx perfectly offset each other in terms of their effect on the regime's desired action. Given this, hidden actions will depend only on the difference θ −x. This implies that the family of hidden action functions ax(θ) can be represented by a single function a : R → R + that takes θ −x as an argument.
Although it involves a slight abuse of notation, it's convenient to acknowledge this alternative representation by writing ax(θ) = a(θ −x).
Citizens' problem. Letθ denote a candidate for the regime's threshold and letâ : R → R + denote a candidate hidden action profile satisfyingâ(θ) = 0 for θ <θ. LetP (θ, x i ) denote the probability assigned by a citizen with signal x i to θ <θ when the hidden actions areâ(θ), sô
where the numerator usesâ(θ) = 0 for θ <θ. This probability has the properties:
Lemma 2. For anyθ ∈ R and anyâ : R → R + such thatâ(θ) = 0 for θ <θ, the function P : R × R → [0, 1] is continuous and:
(i) strictly increasing inθ withP (−∞, x i ) = 0 andP (∞, x i ) = 1 for any x i , and
(ii) strictly decreasing in x i withP (θ, −∞) = 1 andP (θ, ∞) = 0 for anyθ. Now instead of an arbitrary thresholdθ and hidden actionsâ(θ), suppose almost all citizens subvert the regime when they have signals x <x and the corresponding solution to the regime's problem is given by threshold θx and hidden actions ax(θ) from (13)- (14). For eachx ∈ R we can construct a posterior probability of the regime's overthrow analogous to (15). Write this probability as P (θx, x i ,x) where
and where the denominator uses the representation ax(θ) = a(θ −x). Since θx is pinned down byx through (13)- (14), this probability is a function only ofx and the citizen's signal x i . To acknowledge this, write K(x, x i ) := P (θx, x i ,x). Then:
] is continuous and:
(i) strictly decreasing in x i with K(x, −∞) = 1 and K(x, ∞) = 0 for anyx, and
(ii) satisfies
for anyx ∈ R. For x i =x in particular K(x,x) = P (θx −x, 0, 0).
A citizen with signal x i will subvert the regime if and only if K(x, x i ) ≥ p. Therefore given the solution to the regime's problem as implied by (13)- (14), the signal thresholdx solves
Solving the problems simultaneously. Now define a function µ :
This function does not depend onx. And given Lemma 2 and we know µ is continuous, µ (z) > 0 all z ∈ R with µ(−∞) = 0 and µ(∞) = 1. Equation (18) therefore implies a unique value θ
To show that there is a unique monotone equilibrium, we take this difference θ * − x * and plug it into the regime's indifference condition (14). Using ax(θ) = a(θ −x) and the definition of the mass of subversives Sx(θ + a), the regime's indifference condition (14) can be written
The right hand side of (20) depends only on the difference θx −x and not on θx orx independently.
Because of this, we can plug θ * − x * into the right hand side of (20) to solve uniquely for the regime threshold θ * ∈ [0, 1) so that we know both θ * and the signal threshold x * ∈ R separately. The equilibrium hidden actions are then a(θ − x * ).
Iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies
We can now go on to show that there is no other equilibrium. The argument begins by showing that for sufficiently low signals it is a dominant strategy to subvert the regime and for sufficiently high signals it is a dominant strategy to not subvert the regime.
Dominance regions.
If the regime has θ < 0, any mass S ≥ 0 can overthrow the regime. Similarly, if the regime has θ ≥ 1 it can never be overthrown. Any regime that is overthrown takes no action, since to do so would incur a cost for no gain. Similarly, any regime θ that is not overthrown takes an action no larger than the a such that θ = C(a). Any larger action must result in a negative payoff which can be improved upon by taking the outside option. Given this:
Lemma 4. There exists a pair of signals x < x, both finite, such that s(x i ) = 1 is strictly dominant for x i < x and s(x i ) = 0 is strictly dominant for
The most pessimistic scenario for any citizen is that the regime is overthrown only if θ < 0.
Moreover in this scenario the largest hidden action that could be rational for regime θ is a(θ) := C −1 (θ) for θ ≥ 0 and zero otherwise. Given this, we can use Lemma 2 to show that there exist citizens with sufficiently low signals x i < x. For these citizens, irrespective of the actions or beliefs of other agents, it is (iteratively) strictly dominant to subvert the regime. Analogously, the most optimistic scenario for any citizen is that the regime is overthrown if θ < 1. Moreover, the smallest hidden action that could be rational for regime θ in this scenario is a(θ) := 0. Again we can use Lemma 2 to show there exist citizens with sufficiently high signals x i > x for whom it is strictly dominant to not subvert the regime.
Iterative elimination. Starting from the dominance regions implied by x, x it is then possible to iteratively eliminate (interim) strictly dominated strategies. To begin this iteration we use:
Lemma 5. If it is strictly dominant for s(x i ) = 1 for all x i < x, then the regime is overthrown for at least all θ < θ x where θ x > 0 solves
Similarly, if it is strictly dominant for s(x i ) = 0 for all x i > x, the regime is not overthrown for at least all θ > θ x where θ x < 1 is defined analogously.
This provides the first step in iterating from x, x. Since the mass of citizens who subvert the regime is at least S x (θ + a) we can show that the situation facing citizens is less pessimistic than was assumed in calculating x: the regime is overthrown for all θ < θ x where θ x > 0. Similarly, the mass of citizens who subvert the regime is no more than S x (θ + a) and this implies the situation is less optimistic than was assumed in calculating x: the regime survives for all θ > θ x where θ x < 1.
The incentives for an individual citizen to subvert are at their weakest when they expect all other citizens to subvert only for x i < x. Considering the possibility that some citizens with x i ≥ x also subvert increases the regime threshold and the chances of the regime being overthrown.
More specifically, since cumulative distribution functions are non-decreasing, for any beliefs of the citizens, the posterior probability assigned by a citizen with signal x i to the regime's overthrow is at least as much as the probability they assign to θ < θ x . Equivalently, K(x, x i ) − p is the most conservative estimate of the expected gain to subverting. Lemma 3 and the intermediate value theorem imply there is a unique signal ψ(x) solving
such that if it is strictly dominant for s(x i ) = 1 for all x i < x, then it is strictly dominant for
A parallel argument establishes that if is it strictly dominant for s(x i ) = 0 for all x i > x, then it is strictly dominant for s(x i ) = 0 for at least all
To see how we can use the function ψ to eliminate strictly dominated strategies, let x 1 = ψ(x). We can use Lemma 5 again to construct a new regime threshold 10 θ x 1 > θ x and, since a citizen with signal x i assigns probability at least K(x 1 , x i ) to the regime's overthrow, we can construct a new
for all x i < x 1 , then it is strictly dominant for s(x i ) = 1 for at least all x i < ψ(x 1 ). The key remaining step to prove there is a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium is to derive the fixed point properties of the function ψ : R → R. These are given by:
Lemma 6. The function ψ is continuous and has a unique fixed point
We build up a sequence {x n } ∞ n=0 by iterating on ψ starting from the initial condition x 0 := x. Since ψ is continuous, has a unique fixed point x * = ψ(x * ) with ψ (x * ) ∈ (0, 1) and ψ(x n ) ≤ x * for all x n < x * , this sequence is strictly monotone increasing, bounded above by x * and converges to x * in the limit. Similarly, the sequence {x n } ∞ n=0 obtained by iterating on ψ starting from x 0 := x is strictly monotone decreasing, bounded below by x * and converges to x * in the limit.
Intuitively, these sequences represent the elimination of strictly dominated strategies 'from below' and 'from above'. If no-one else subverts the regime, a citizen with signal
will subvert the regime. Therefore all citizens with signals x < x 1 have s(x) = 1. But if so, at least all citizens with signals less than x 2 = ψ(x 1 ) also subvert the regime. And so on. After n iterations, the only candidates for a citizen's equilibrium strategy all have the property that s(x i ) = 1 for x i < x n and similarly s(x i ) = 0 for x i > x n with s(x i ) arbitrary for x i ∈ [x n , x n ]. In the limit as n → ∞, the only strategy that survives the elimination of strictly dominated strategies is the one with s(x i ) = 1 for x i < x * and s(x i ) = 0 otherwise. In short, the unique monotone equilibrium is the only equilibrium.
Discussion
Signaling and signal-jamming. Theorem 1 contrasts with Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2006) , who were the first to emphasize endogenous information in a global games context. In their benchmark model, individuals get one noisy observation of θ plus one observation of a signal a chosen at cost C(a) by the regime which may also be informative for θ. Individual strategies s(x i , a) may condition on a. In this signaling game, there is typically an uninformative pooling equilibrium and many separating equilibria. For example, if each individual expects no manipulation, individual strategies and hence the aggregate mass S will be independent of a. Given this, the regime has no incentive to manipulate and so validates the original expectation.
The equilibrium multiplicity result in Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2006) is relatively robust in that they also provide examples where individuals receive one idiosyncratically noisy observation of θ and one idiosyncratically noisy signal of a(θ). They show that multiple equilibria arise even in this scenario where out-of-equilibrium beliefs play no role. 11 The essential difference between their model augmented with idiosyncratically noisy observations of the policy action a(θ) and this paper is that here individuals get one noisy observation of one object, the sum θ + a(θ), instead of two separate signals of the two constituent parts.
Loosely speaking, this model is an example of a signal-jamming game. The presence of a signal-jamming technology raises the issue of whether the signal sender, the regime, is effective in deterring citizens from participating. This parallels the industrial organization literature on limit pricing and entry deterrence. In Milgrom and Roberts (1982) an incumbent firm may price below its static monopoly price to signal that it has low costs in the hope of deterring entry. This game has a pooling equilibrium and many separating equilibria where the incumbent's price is indeed below its monopoly price but where limit pricing is ineffective in that a rational entrant correctly infers the incumbent's costs from its price and so enters exactly when it would if the incumbent's costs were observable. By contrast, Matthews and Mirman (1983) study a signal-jamming problem where the entrant observes the incumbent's price with noise. They show there is often a unique equilibrium and that it exhibits both limit pricing and successful entry deterrence.
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Imperfectly coordinated signal receivers. In traditional models of strategic information transmission like Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Matthews and Mirman (1983) there is one sender and one receiver. But in this paper and in Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2006) there is a large cross-section of signal receivers. Since the incentives of the sender to manipulate depend on the aggregate behavior of the receivers and since individual actions are strategic complements, implicitly, each individual receiver's filtering problem depends simultaneously on the solution to the filtering problem of all other receivers. If some citizens believe the regime is manipulating, they will conclude that the regime will survive (since only regimes with θ ≥ θ * actively manipulate) and will not subvert. Because of the strategic complementarity, this will make other individuals less likely to subvert.
That receivers are imperfectly coordinated gives rise to effects absent from the traditional one sender/one receiver game. As discussed in Section 3, when precision is very high and citizens are imperfectly coordinated, signal-jamming is maximally effective: as the precision α → ∞, all the fragile regimes with θ ∈ [0, 1) survive. But if instead citizens are perfectly coordinated then all the regimes with θ ∈ [0, 1) are overthrown.
Equilibrium information manipulation
The second main result of this paper is that the regime's signal-jamming technology becomes more effective as the precision α increases. Section 3.1 prepares the ground by characterizing equilibrium hidden actions. Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 show that signal-jamming can be effective in equilibrium even when the regime is playing against rational citizens who internalize the regime's incentives. To give intuition for this, I first use a simple example with constant marginal costs before turning to more general convex costs.
Terminology. Throughout this section I draw a distinction between whether signal-jamming occurs in equilibrium (when a(θ) > 0 for some θ) and whether it is effective. I measure the effectiveness of signal-jamming by its ability to reduce the regime's threshold θ * relative to the Morris-Shin level of θ * MS = 1 − p (as in Proposition 1). A lower θ * increases the regime's ex ante survival probability by making it more likely that nature draws a θ ≥ θ * . For high enough α the regime has θ * < 1 − p so that endowing a regime with a signal-jamming technology allows it to survive in more states than it would in the Morris-Shin world. I say that the regime benefits from lower θ * even though this does not necessarily increase the regime's payoff. In principle, it might be the case that lower θ * is achieved through large, costly, actions that give the regime a lower payoff than they would achieve in the Morris-Shin world. But it turns out that as precision α → ∞ and θ * falls, hidden actions also become small so that the fall in θ * represents a genuine increase in payoffs, at least in the limit.
Regime's hidden actions
In equilibrium, hidden actions a(θ) are characterized by the first order necessary condition
The marginal benefit of an action is the associated reduction in the mass of subversives and at an interior solution this is equated to C (a). For signal-jamming to occur (meaning a(θ) > 0 for at least some θ), the cost function either has to be either (i) strictly convex, or (ii) if marginal costs are constant, C (a) = c all a, then the level of c cannot be 'too high': c < √ αφ(0) =: c. If either of these conditions is satisfied, then actions are zero for all θ < θ * before jumping up discontinuously to a positive value at the threshold θ * . As the fundamentals of the regime become strong, costly actions taken to generate a favorable signal distribution begin to encounter diminishing returns and the action profile dies to zero. Figure 2 illustrates. Even if some regimes manipulate information in equilibrium, it is not necessarily the case that the existence of the signal-jamming technology is to the regime's benefit. To understand when a regime does benefit from the signal-jamming technology, I first specialize to the case of constant marginal costs. This example allows for explicit calculations showing that signal-jamming is effective when the signal precision α is sufficiently high.
Signal-jamming example: constant marginal costs
Let C(a) := ca for some constant c ∈ (0, c) where c := √ αφ(0) so that a(θ) > 0 for some θ. Then manipulating equation (22) shows that interior solutions to the regime's problem are given by
where θ * * := x * + γ and where
In this case, the signal-jamming is acute. All regimes that manipulate information pool on the same distribution of signals. Since the signal mean is θ + a(θ), all regimes that manipulate, i.e., θ ∈ [θ * , θ * * ), generate a mean of θ + x * + γ − θ = x * + γ =: θ * * . These regimes mimic the signal mean of a regime type θ * * that is intrinsically more difficult to overthrow (than they are) and generate signals for the citizens x i = x * + γ + ε i that are locally completely uninformative about θ.
More precise information makes signal-jamming effective. In the absence of manipulation, higher precision α makes signals more tightly clustered around the true θ. Does this help citizens overthrow fragile regimes θ ∈ [0, 1) that survive only because of imperfect coordination? In the Morris-Shin case, the answer is 'no': the equilibrium threshold θ * MS = 1 − p is invariant to the precision of the private information.
14 With endogenous information manipulation, matters are even worse for the citizens. A regime's signal-jamming is more effective for high values of α than for low values.
To see this formally, use the definition of a citizen's posterior probability of overthrowing the regime (16) and write the indifference condition for the marginal citizen evaluated at x * , θ * as
where a subscript α acknowledges dependence on the signal precision. Rearranging gives
Now use the first order condition (22) and C (a) = c to simplify the right hand side integral
where the first equality uses a(θ) = 0 for θ ≥ θ * * α from (23) and the second equality uses θ * * α = x * α + γ α . Plugging this back into (25) gives us the first of two equations characterizing the two unknown thresholds
The second equation comes from the regime's indifference condition (14) and can be written
For each α > 0, the two equations (26)- (27) 
The only solution to equation (28) is θ * α − x * α = 0. So as α → ∞, solutions to equation (26) approach zero too. From equation (27) we now know that θ * α → 0 + . Therefore, the signaljamming technology is effective when the precision α is large enough. For large α the regime's threshold θ * α is less than the Morris-Shin level of θ * MS = 1 − p and the regime's survival probability is correspondingly higher.
Intuition for the result. Why does a higher α help regimes? First, from (23) for any finite α and hence any γ > 0 there is an interval of regimes [θ * , θ * * ) who take actions that lead them to imitate the signal mean of a higher type of regime θ * * that is intrinsically harder to overthrow than they are. Second, with high α there is a large density of citizens near the signal mean (wherever that happens to be). Since an interval of regimes is able to imitate the signal mean of a higher type of regime, it is rational for any individual, when contemplating the beliefs of others, to assign relatively high probability to the event that they have signals near this artificially high mean θ * * > θ * . At the margin this makes any individual less likely to attack and so the aggregate mass S who do is relatively low. 
Signal-jamming: the general case
The effectiveness of signal-jamming when α is large extends to the case of general convex costs:
15 This intuition is not quite complete: there is a second effect. Note γ → 0 as α → ∞ so θ * * → θ * as α → ∞ and the interval of pooled types also shrinks as α becomes large. For the intuition in the text to be the dominant effect it also needs to be the case that γ → 0 sufficiently slowly relative to the speed at which the density of signals at the signal mean increases. For large α, the rate at which the density increases is of order √ α while for large α the constant γ is of order log(α)/α which decreases slowly relative to the rate at which √ α increases. To characterize signal-jamming in the general case, rearrange (23) to get an alternative implicit characterization of the hidden actions
which is (23) generalized to arbitrary convex costs but at the expense of losing the closed-form solution. By implicitly differentiating with respect to θ, it's possible to show that a (θ) ≥ −1 with strict equality if C (a) > 0 (so the signal mean θ + a(θ) is increasing in θ, strictly if costs are strictly convex). But as α → ∞, regimes that manipulate have a (θ) → −1 so that signals are locally uninformative. Moreover, since generally a(θ * ) > 0, the signal mean for a regime that intervenes is strictly larger than θ * so that signal-jamming is effective as α becomes sufficiently large because each individual worries about a large number of others drawing signals that suggest the regime is not going to be overthrown.
Numerical examples. With general cost functions the model cannot be solved analytically. Figure 3 shows θ * α as a function of precision α under the assumption that C(a) := 0.5a 2 for three levels of p. The higher the individual opportunity cost p, the lower the threshold and the thresholds are decreasing in the signal precision. In these examples, the speed of convergence to the limit is faster if p is high and slower if p is low. Regimes that inhabit a world where the individual cost of subversion p is high may benefit most from a given increase in α.
Interpretation. These results suggest that a regime's less overt propaganda apparatus (pressure exerted on editors, generals forced to stand on parade, etc) will be more useful when individuals are receiving signals that are of sufficiently high intrinsic quality (from a technological standpoint).
16 As discussed in Section 3.1, if the marginal cost at zero is too large C (0) > c := √ αφ(0), then the cost of information manipulation is so high that the model reduces to the standard Morris-Shin game. When we take α → ∞ this bound does not matter. When we take α → 0 + this bound will be violated. Consequently, the second part of Theorem 2 deals only with the case of strictly convex costs. In equilibrium signals may be very uninformative, but that is precisely because the regime is coopting the technology to its own ends. 17 A regime will want to exert a strong influence over the media when the signal precision is high enough.
Role of imperfect coordination. Disaggregated information is essential to the regime's ability to benefit from higher signal precision. To see this, suppose that citizens were perfectly coordinated and able to act as a large agent of mass one who could force regime change for all θ < 1. Suppose also that this mass receives one signal x with precision α that is contaminated by the regime's action. Finally, suppose that costs are strictly convex. Then, as in the benchmark model, for high precision the regime receives almost no benefit from taking a costly action and a(θ) → 0 for all θ 
Equilibrium beliefs
Regimes benefit when α is sufficiently high. Is this because in equilibrium citizens somehow fail to filter out the information manipulation? Yes and no: 'no' in that for high enough α all citizens discount their signals, but 'yes' in that they typically do not discount enough.
To see this, first suppose that a citizen with signal x i was naive and believed she lived in the Morris-Shin world where no manipulation takes place. Her posterior expectation for θ would equal x i . Let D(x i ) denote the difference between the rational expectation of θ and the naive expectation
If D(x i ) > 0, the regime's propaganda has successfully induced this citizen to believe that θ is relatively high. Otherwise, if D(x i ) < 0, this citizen believes θ is relatively low. The average But this does not mean they discount their signals enough. The bottom panel of Figure 4 shows the relationship between a(θ), which is the amount by which citizens should discount their information, and a(θ)π(θ|x i )dθ, which is the amount that someone with x i does discount their signal. Critically, there are regimes with θ ≥ θ * that engage in more manipulation in equilibrium than is believed by any citizen. Citizens 'under-discount' the manipulation done by fragile regimes just above the threshold θ * . Similarly, since a(θ) = 0 for θ < θ * and a(θ) → 0 for large θ, most citizens 'over-discount' the manipulation done by either very weak or very strong regimes. The model that delivers these results is stylized and it's natural to question its robustness. To investigate this, Section 4 extends the model to consider regimes that only care about survival.
Regimes still benefit from better information. Alternative information structures are covered in Section 5: for some but not all of these structures, regimes benefit from better information.
Regime cares only about survival
Let the payoff to a regime be B(S, θ) − C(a) where
so that a regime cares about S only to the extent that a high S makes it harder to survive. I consider two specifications for v(θ). In the first, v(θ) = θ so that as in the benchmark model the (gross) value a regime attaches to survival is perfectly correlated with its 'strength' as measured by its ability to withstand a mass S of given size. In the second specification, v(θ) = v > 0 so that the value a regime attaches to survival is independent of its strength (and is common knowledge).
Characterization of equilibrium. With these payoffs, only fragile regimes with θ ∈ [0, 1) could possibly have an incentive to manipulate. The mass of subversives is
and if an action a(θ) > 0 is chosen, it is set at just the right level to ensure that θ = S(θ, a).
and zero otherwise. Any higher an action would incur a cost for no benefit. Given a signal threshold x * , the upper boundary θ * * ∈ [θ * , 1) is the unique solution to θ
Given x * , equation (31) (16) and this implicitly determines a threshold x * as a function of θ * . An equilibrium is calculated by simultaneously solving these two conditions for x * , θ * .
4.1 Regime type and value of survival are the same.
Let v(θ) = θ and specialize to C(a) = ca when α is large. Let x * , θ * and a(θ) denote equilibrium objects for the benchmark economy and letx * ,θ * andâ(θ) denote the same objects in the economy where the regime cares only about survival.
From (23) we have approximately a(θ) = max[0, x * − θ] when α is large. But from (31) we
for each θ. To further check robustness, I have solved the model numerically with strictly convex costs and when α is small. Figure 3 shows θ * ,θ * as functions of α for various levels of p. The qualitative similarity between the model with the benchmark payoffs and the alternative payoffs is clear even for relatively low α.
Regime type and value of survival are independent.
A similar result obtains for the other specification where v(θ) = v all θ. Hidden actions are still given by (31) 
Alternative information structures
Until now, improvements in the quality of information were modeled as increases in the precision α. But in the benchmark model there is only one kind of information and it is affected by the regime's action. Section 5.1 allows citizens to have clean sources of information uncontaminated by the regime's actions. Section 5.2 changes the technology available to the regime, giving it the ability to manipulate the precision of signal information rather than the signal mean.
Uncontaminated information
I first consider the case where citizens are endowed with a second private signal independent of the regime's a and then turn to the case of a public signal. This second exercise connects the model to recent papers in the global games literature regarding the differential effects of private and public information on equilibrium uniqueness.
Heterogeneous informative priors. Let citizens have two idiosyncratically noisy signals
where ε z,i is normal noise with precision α z independent of ε x,i which has precision α x . The z i signals can be treated as heterogeneous priors and unlike x i are not contaminated by the regime's choice of a. This is equivalent to idiosyncratically noisy information on the hidden action, say
A monotone equilibrium consists of hidden actions a(θ), state threshold θ * and signal thresholds x * (z i ) such that a citizen with x i , z i subverts if x i < x * (z i ). Unfortunately, it is difficult to provide an analytic characterization of the equilibrium with both contaminated and uncontaminated private information, so the discussion below merely provides examples. The key finding is that an exogenous increase in the precision of uncontaminated information α z may still reduce θ * . Figure 5: As precision α z of uncontaminated private information increases, regimes near θ * take smaller actions a(θ) but diminishing returns do not set in at such low values of θ. Citizens give more weight to their uncontaminated information so x * (z i ) is steeper: for low z i it takes a higher contaminated x i to induce subversion. Figure 5 shows the actions a(θ) and the thresholds x * (z i ) for α z = α x = 0.5 and for α z = 2.5.
As the uncontaminated information increases in quality, regimes with types larger than θ * take smaller actions. But when α z is high, diminishing returns do not set in so quickly: a(θ) is noticeably positive for more θ. The right hand panel shows the corresponding thresholds x * (z i ); these are decreasing because if an individual gets a low z i it takes a high x i to induce subversion. As α z increases, x * (z i ) becomes steeper so that the z i are weighed more heavily and it takes, for example, an even bigger x i to compensate for a low z i . Figure 6 shows θ * as a function of the uncontaminated precision α z for various opportunity costs p. The θ * are lower than the Morris-Shin levels 1 − p so that signal-jamming is effective and are decreasing in the precision α z of the uncontaminated private information. But compared to the model with only contaminated information, the effects of an increase in α z on θ * are small.
These examples are only suggestive of what can happen in equilibrium. But it is clear that introducing uncontaminated private information does not necessarily overturn the results of Section 3. A clean information revolution may still increase the survival probability of a regime. In these examples a regime may benefit even from an increase in the quality of 'clean' information. Equilibrium thresholds are relatively insensitive to α z .
Common informative priors/public signal. Let citizens have a public signal
The realization of z is common knowledge and again is an uncontaminated signal of θ. If no hidden actions are possible, the model reduces to a setup studied by Angeletos and Werning (2006) , Hellwig (2002) , Metz (2002) , and Morris and Shin (2000, 2003) and others. For each z, a monotone equilibrium is a threshold x * (z) such that individuals subvert if x i < x * (z) and a θ * (z) such that regimes are overthrown if θ < θ * (z). It is well known that if public information is too precise relative to private information, there may be multiple monotone equilibria [see, e.g., Hellwig (2002) and Morris and Shin (2003, 2004) ]. If public information is too precise, there is 'approximate' common knowledge of θ. Hellwig (2002) derived a sufficient condition for a unique monotone equilibrium in a game of this kind, namely α z / √ α x < √ 2π. In the discussion that follows, I assume that this is satisfied. What happens if the precision of private information increases? As α x → ∞ for given α z (or as α z → 0 for given α x ) the public signal becomes uninformative and we revert to the Morris-Shin game with x * (z) → θ * (z) and θ * (z) → 1 − p independent of the realization of the public signal z.
If the quality of private information is sufficiently good, the public information z is irrelevant. Metz (2002) characterized the direction from which θ * (z) converges to 1 − p as α x → ∞. If the parameters p or z are favorable to the regime, then θ * (z) 1 − p but if the parameters p or z are unfavorable to the regime, θ * (z) 1 − p. Why? Both x i and z are informative about θ, but only x i is informative about the role of coordination. Also, it is common knowledge that signals are bunched around θ and that every citizen gives weight to their idiosyncratic signal in proportion to its quality. Now consider an economy with high z (which suggests the regime is going to be difficult to beat, since high z is correlated with high θ). For moderate α x , citizens will give some weight to this public signal and will be less inclined to engage in subversion. So for moderate precision, θ * (z) is low and the ex ante survival probability of the regime is high. But as α x increases, the influence of the high realized z diminishes because everybody knows that everybody gives less weight to z when α x increases. In the limit, only the opportunity cost p matters and θ * (z) 1 − p. I refer to this as the coordination effect from increasing idiosyncratic signal precision.
With hidden actions the coordination effect is dominant for low α x and θ * (z) is increasing in α x if p or z is high but decreasing in α x if p or z is low. But the coordination effect is limited:
when α x is large, people ignore z and the effects of further increase in α x are almost nil. Now recall the basic hidden action model with no public signal: the state threshold approached zero as the idiosyncratic signal precision became large. So we expect for high α x , the existence of a public signal is almost immaterial and the hidden action effect of information manipulation is dominant. Metz (2002) and the hidden action effect pull in opposite directions, giving rise to a 'hump-shaped' function. If primitives are unfavorable to the regime (say p = 0.25), both forces drive θ * down. Figure 7 suggests that this intuition is correct. When primitives are favorable to the regime, the coordination effect and the hidden action effect pull in opposing directions. The coordination effect tends to drive the equilibrium threshold up and to reduce the survival probability of the regime. But for high α x the coordination effect is irrelevant while the hidden action effect still matters. In this case, the thresholds have a 'hump-shaped' look and asymptote to zero. But if primitives are unfavorable to the regime, both the coordination and hidden action effects are in the regime's favor and reinforce each other. In this case, the threshold is monotone decreasing and asymptotes to zero. If primitives are unfavorable to the regime, there is a large benefit from information manipulation (this contrasts with the benchmark model where regimes with favorable primitives benefitted more from a given increase in α x ).
Uncontaminated public information does not undo the central message of the hidden actions model. For high α x signal-jamming is effective, θ * < θ * MS = 1 − p. Better private information may increase the regime's ex ante survival probability. But perhaps this is not the most interesting comparative static. What if the precision of the public signal increases? Then we run into the problem of multiplicity. For given α x , the inequality α z / √ α x < √ 2π will eventually be violated and there are multiple monotone equilibria. In this case, we lose the ability to draw sharp conclusions.
What if both the precisions of the public and private information increase together? Then if the bound on the relative precision of the public information is satisfied the analysis goes through essentially as above. At a given level of the relative precision α z / √ α x , the threshold may be increasing or decreasing (depending on the relative strengths of the coordination effect and the hidden action effect), but as the ratio α z / √ α x becomes small the hidden action effect dominates.
Manipulating signal precision
Until now, signal manipulation entered in an additive way:
With this specification the action shifts the mean of the signal distribution without (directly) influencing the precision. Now let signals be x i := θ + ε i with the precision of ε i given by
With this specification, negative actions a < 0 are possible and we need to reinterpret the cost function C. When a > 0, the regime sets a precision β(a) > α and when a < 0, the regime sets a precision β(a) < α. Accordingly, I refer to α as the intrinsic precision of private information.
Actions are zero for θ < θ * before jumping discontinuously at θ * . If x * > θ * , the jump is down but if x * < θ * the jump is up. Intuitively, if the regime has intermediate type θ ∈ [θ * , x * ) then it worsens the signal noise relative to α (it muddies the signal). Otherwise, if θ > x * then the regime finds it worthwhile to clarify its position of strength and so increase the signal precision relative to α. Figure 8 illustrates with parameters chosen so x * > θ * and the profile jumps down at θ * .
Transparency. In related work Bannier and Heinemann (2005) and Heinemann and Illing (2002) study higher signal precision (more 'transparency') in the Morris-Shin game by allowing the regime to choose the individuals' signal precision to minimize the probability of a successful attack. But in their formulation the regime's choice of precision does not depend on its type θ and so when forming beliefs individuals can take this precision as exogenous. In Figure 8 , a regime reduces transparency in this sense if θ ∈ [θ * , x * ) and increases transparency if θ > x * . Figure 8 : Equilibrium hidden actions a(θ) when regime can manipulate signal precision. For intermediate θ it may be optimal for the regime to 'muddy' the signal, a(θ) < 0, relative to the benchmark α. For high θ it is optimal for the regime to clarify its strength, a(θ) > 0.
Final remarks
The coordination games studied in this paper are deliberately stylized so as to focus attention on the use of information manipulation as a tool for influencing equilibrium outcomes. In keeping things simple, I have abstracted from issues that might play a role in the development of a more complete model of information, coordination and regime change. For example, information accumulation over time, non-simultaneous moves by groups of citizens and strategic communication between individuals might all be important components of a richer analysis. Moreover, for some applications it might be desirable to have several 'large' players with competing interests over equilibrium outcomes (for example, if one large player has an interest in the status quo while a rival large player seeks its overthrow). In such situations, individuals beliefs and equilibrium outcomes would depend on the interactions between several hidden actions each of which is trying to push beliefs in a different direction. 
. The probability on the right hand side is continuous and strictly decreasing in θ, so for eachx there is a unique state for which a regime is indifferent. The Morris-Shin thresholds x verify that there is only one solution to these equations and that θ *
Proof of Lemma 1. Fixx ∈ R. (i) From the envelope theorem W x (θ) = 1 − S x (θ + a) > 1 all θ since S x (θ + a) < 0. Since Sx ≥ 0 and C ≥ 0 we know Wx(θ) < 0 all θ < 0. Similarly, Wx(1) > 0. So by the intermediate value theorem there is a unique θx ∈ [0, 1) such that Wx(θx) = 0. And since W x (θ) > 1 the regime is overthrown if and only if θ < θx. (ii) Since positive actions are costly, the regime takes no action for θ < θx. Otherwise, for θ ≥ θx, the actions of the regime solve ax(θ) ∈ argmax a≥0 [θ − Sx(θ + a) − C(a)]. The first order necessary condition for interior solutions can be written
Using φ(w) := exp(−w 2 /2)/ √ 2π all w ∈ R, the first order condition may have zero, one or two solutions for each θ. If for given θ there are zero (interior) solutions, then ax(θ) = 0. If for given θ there are two solutions, one of them can be ruled out by the second order sufficient condition −αφ [ √ α(x − θ − a)] − C (a) < 0. Using the property φ (w) = −wφ(w) all w ∈ R shows that if there are two solutions to the first order condition, only the 'higher' of them satisfies the second order condition. Therefore for each θ there is a single ax(θ) that solves the regime's problem.
Proof of Lemma 2. For notational simplicity, write θ for the state threshold, x for an individual's signal and P (θ, x) for the probability an individual with x assigns to the regime's type being less that θ when the actions areâ : R → R + . From (15), this probability can be written
where 
where H(w) := φ(w)/[1 − Φ(w)] > 0 denotes the standard normal hazard function for w ∈ R, whereŷ(ξ) := ξ +â(ξ) is the mean of the signal distribution if ξ ≥ θ, and where the equality follows from φ (w) = −wφ(w) all w. Now define a density ϕ(ξ|x) > 0 by
Then after a slight rearrangement of terms in (38), P x < 0 if and only if
Since the hazard function satisfies H(w) > w all w ∈ R and α > 0 it is sufficient that (41) is always satisfied. Therefore P x < 0. The limit properties in x are established in parallel fashion to the limit properties in θ shown in part (i).
Proof of Lemma 3. Fixx ∈ R and let a(θ −x) denote the associated hidden actions. Write
where A : R → [0, 1] is defined as in (37) and where
Using this representation, we have that for K(x, x) = P (θx −x, x −x, 0) it is sufficient that B(θx, x,x) = B(θx −x, x −x, 0). From (42) and using the change of variables ξ := θ −x we have
Therefore K(x, x) = P (θx −x, x −x, 0) too.
Proof of Lemma 4. The most pessimistic scenario for any citizen is that regimes are overthrown only if θ < 0 and that regimes take the largest hidden actions that could be rational a(θ) := C −1 (θ) for θ ≥ 0 and zero otherwise. Let P (x) := Pr[θ < 0 | x, a(·)] denote the probability the regime is overthrown in this most pessimistic scenario. Lemma 2 holds for hidden actions of the form a(θ) and implies P (x) < 0 all x and since P (−∞) = 1 and P (∞) = 0 by the intermediate value theorem there is a unique value, x, finite, such that P (x) = p. For x < x it is (iteratively) strictly dominant for s(x) = 1. Similarly, the most optimistic scenario for any citizen is that regimes are overthrown if θ < 1 and that regimes take the smallest hidden actions that could be rational a(θ) := 0. Let P (x) := Pr[θ < 1 | x, a(·)] denote the probability the regime is overthrown in this most optimistic scenario. A parallel argument establishes the existence of a unique value, x, finite, such that P (x) = p. For x > x it is (iteratively) strictly dominant for s(x) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 5. All citizens with signals x < x have s(x) = 1 so the mass of subversives is at least Φ[ √ α(x − (θ + a))]. To acknowledge this, write the total mass of subversives as
for some function ∆ : R → [0, 1]. First consider the case ∆ = 0 where only citizens with x < x subvert the regime. From Lemma 1 there is a unique threshold θ x ∈ [0, 1) sustained by hidden action a x (θ x ) ≥ 0 solving (13)- (14) such that the regime is overthrown if θ < θ x . Now consider the case ∆ > 0 where some citizens with signals x ≥ x also subvert the regime. The proof that the regime is overthrown for at least all θ < θ x is by contradiction. Suppose that when ∆ > 0 regime change occurs for all θ <θ for someθ ≤ θ x . A marginal regimeθ must be indifferent between being overthrown and taking the outside option, so this threshold satisfiesθ = S(θ +ã) + C(ã) whereã ≥ 0 is the optimal action for the marginal regimeθ. Then observe
where the first inequality follows because a x (θ) minimizes Φ[ √ α(x − (θ + a))] + C(a) and where the second inequality follows from ∆ > 0. Taking a =ã ≥ 0 we then have
where the last inequality follows because the hypothesisθ
. This is a contradiction, and soθ > θ x . Therefore, the regime is overthrown for at least all θ < θ x . A parallel argument shows that if it is strictly dominant for s(x) = 0 for all x > x, then the regime is not overthrown for at least all θ > θ x where θ x is defined analogously.
Proof of Lemma 6. Since K(x, x) is continuously differentiable in x, an application of the implicit function theorem to (21) shows that ψ is continuous. Fixed points of ψ satisfy x * = ψ(x * ). Equivalently, by Lemma 3, they satisfy K(x * , x * ) = P (θ(x * ) − x * , 0, 0) = p, where, in another slight abuse of notation, θ(x) is the critical state in the regime's problem (13)- (14). By Lemma 2 and the intermediate value theorem there is a unique z * ∈ R such that P (z * , 0, 0) = p. Applying the implicit function theorem to (13)- (14) gives
Since θ(−∞) = 0 and θ(∞) = 1, there is a unique x * ∈ R such that θ(x * ) − x * = z * , hence ψ has a unique fixed point, the same x * . Now using Lemma 3 and implicitly differentiating (21) we have
By Lemma 2, P θ > 0 and P x < 0 and θ (x) ∈ (0, 1) from (45). Therefore ψ (x) < 1 for allx. To see that ψ (x * ) > 0, first notice that it is sufficient that P θ /P x ≥ −1 when evaluated atx = x * . Calculating the derivatives shows that this is true if and only if
where θ * := θ(x * ) and where y(t) = t + a(t) is the mean of the signal distribution from which a citizen is sampling if the regime has type t ≥ θ * . To show that this condition always holds, we need to consider two separate cases: (i) where costs are linear, and (ii) where costs are strictly convex. If costs are linear, C(a) = ca, then if c ≥ c := √ αφ(0) the result is trivial because a(t) = 0 for all t ∈ R. So suppose c < c. Then a(t) = max[0, x * +γ−t] where γ := 2 log ( √ αφ(0)/c) /α > 0. Calculating the integral and then simplifying shows that (47) holds if and only if −αγφ( √ αγ)a(θ * ) ≤ 0 which is true because a(θ * ) ≥ 0. Now consider case (ii) where costs are strictly convex. From the optimality conditions for the regime's choice of action we have that a(t) > 0 for all t ≥ θ * and
Differentiating with respect to t gives
Using the associated second order condition shows that y (t) > 0 for t ≥ θ * . Since y is invertible, a change of variables shows that (47) holds if and only if
Using (49) we equivalently have the condition
which is true since the integrand is non-negative. Therefore, P θ /P x ≥ −1 atx = x * and ψ (x * ) > 0. Finally, ψ(x) ≤ x * for everyx < x * is proven by contradiction. Suppose not. Then by continuity of ψ there existsx < x * such that ψ(x) = x * . Moreover, since ψ (x * ) > 0, we must have ψ (x) < 0 for at least one suchx. Since ψ(x) = x * and K(x * , x * ) = p, under this hypothesis we can write K[ψ(x), ψ(x)] = p so by the implicit function theorem ψ(x) must satisfy
where the hypothesis ψ(x) = x * is used to evaluate the derivatives of K. Since ψ (x) < 0, this can only be satisfied if K 1 (x * , x * ) + K 2 (x * , x * ) = 0. But for anyx ∈ R, the value ψ(x) is implicitly defined by K[x, ψ(x)] = p so that by the implicit function theorem ψ (x) = −K 1 [x, ψ(x)]/K 2 [x, ψ(x)]. From (46) we know ψ (x) < 1 for anyx and since K 2 < 0 from Lemma 3 we conclude K 1 [x, ψ(x)] + K 2 [x, ψ(x)] < 0 for anyx. Forx = x * in particular, K 1 (x * , x * ) + K 2 (x * , x * ) < 0 so we have the needed contradiction. Therefore ψ(x) ≤ x * for everyx < x * . A symmetric argument shows ψ(x) ≥ x * for everyx > x * .
Proof of Theorem 1. There is a unique equilibrium in monotone strategies. To show this, we take arbitraryx ∈ R and solve the regime's problem to get θx and ax(θ) = a(θ −x) from Lemma 1. We use these functions to construct K(x, x i ) for each signal x i ∈ R using (16) and use Lemma 3 to conclude that K(x,x) = P (θx −x, 0, 0). Then let µ(z) := P (z, 0, 0) and use Lemma 3 and the intermediate value theorem to deduce that there is a unique z * ∈ R such that µ(z * ) = p. This gives a unique difference z * = θ * − x * that can be plugged into the regime's indifference condition (20) to get the unique θ * ∈ [0, 1) such that the regime is overthrown if and only if θ < θ * . The unique signal threshold is then x * = θ * − z * and the unique hidden action function is given by, in a slight abuse of notation, a(θ) := a(θ − x * ). To show there is no other equilibrium, we use Lemma 4 to establish dominance regions delineated by x, x, both finite, such that it is an (iteratively) dominant strategy for s(x) = 1 for all x < x and for s(x) = 0 for all x > x. This leaves open the behavior of s(x) for x ∈ [x, x]. We then use Lemma 5 to conclude that if it is strictly dominant for s(x) = 1 for all x < x, then the regime is overthrown for at least all θ < θ x where θ x > 0 and solves (13)-(14). Since cumulative distribution functions are non-decreasing, for any beliefs of the citizens, the posterior probability assigned by a citizen to the regime's overthrow is at least as much as the probability they assign to θ < θ x . Therefore the expected gain from s(x) = 1 to a citizen with signal x is at least K(x, x i )−p. Lemma 3 and the intermediate value theorem imply there is a unique ψ(x) solving K[x, ψ(x)] = p such that if it is strictly dominant for s(x) = 1 for all x < x, then it is strictly dominant for s(x) = 1 for at least all x < ψ(x). A parallel argument establishes that if is it strictly dominant for s(x) = 0 for all x > x, then it is strictly dominant for s(x) = 0 for at least all x > ψ(x).
Now let x 0 := x and x 0 := x and generate sequences {x n } ∞ n=0 from x n+1 = ψ(x n ) and {x n } ∞ n=0
from x n+1 = ψ(x n ). By Lemma 6 ψ is continuous, has a unique fixed point x * = ψ(x * ) (the same x * as above) with ψ (x * ) ∈ (0, 1) and ψ(x n ) ≤ x * for all x n < x * . Therefore {x n } ∞ n=0 is bounded above, strictly monotone increasing and so converges x n x * as n → ∞. Similarly {x n } ∞ n=0 is bounded below, strictly monotone decreasing and so converges x n x * . After n iterations, the only candidates for an equilibrium strategy all have s(x) = 1 for x < x n and s(x) = 0 for x > x n with s(x) arbitrary for x ∈ [x n , x n ]. In the limit as n → ∞, the only strategy that survives the elimination of strictly dominated strategies is the one with s(x) = 1 for x < x * and s(x) = 0 otherwise. Therefore the only equilibrium is the unique monotone equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 2. For each precision α, there is a unique equilibrium. I find a unique solution to a constrained problem consisting of the original system of nonlinear equations plus a set of constraints that govern the asymptotic behavior of the endogenous variables. But, because the equilibrium conditions have a unique solution for each α, the solution to the original problem and to the constrained problem coincide.
The equilibrium conditions can be written
The role of coordination: regime vs. single agent
This appendix highlights the role of imperfect coordination in enabling the regime to survive even when signals are precise. Suppose to the contrary that citizens are perfectly coordinated and receive one x := θ + a + ε. Collectively, they can overthrow the regime if θ < 1. In a monotone equilibrium the mass attacks the regime, S(x) = 1, if and only if x < x * where x * solves Pr(θ < 1|x * ) = p. The regime now faces aggregate uncertainty. It does not know what value of x will realize. The regime chooses its hidden action to maximize its expected payoff 
Regimes with θ < 0 are overthrown and so never engage in costly manipulation.
Example: strictly convex costs. Suppose, with some loss of generality, that costs are strictly convex, C (a) > 0. This implies all regimes θ > 0 will choose some positive manipulation a(θ) > 0 even regimes that are overthrown ex post. The key first order necessary condition for the regime's choice of action a(θ) is
As usual, there may be two solutions to this first order condition: if so, the smaller is eliminated by the second order condition. An equilibrium of this game is constructed by simultaneously determining a(θ) and the x * that solves Pr(θ < 1|x * ) = p. The first order condition implies that taking as given x * the regime's a(θ) → 0 + as α → ∞.
Given this, the probability of overthrowing the regime Pr(θ < 1|x) → 1{x < 1} as α → ∞. This implies x * → 1. With arbitrarily precise information, the regime takes no action and so x is very close to θ. The mass attacks only if it believes θ < 1 and since x is close to θ attacks only if x < 1. So if citizens are perfectly coordinated then for precise information regime change occurs for all θ < 1. By contrast, Theorem 2 tells us that if citizens are imperfectly coordinated then for precise information all regimes θ ≥ 0 survive. Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2006) provide a related analysis. In their model, if agents are imperfectly coordinated then for precise information θ * can be any θ ∈ (0, θ * MS ] where θ * MS = 1−p < 1. But if agents are perfectly coordinated then for precise information regime change occurs for all θ < 1. Thus when information is precise the two models agree about the regime change outcome when agents are perfectly coordinated but come to different conclusions when agents are imperfectly coordinated.
